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A Monetary and Financial Wreck: 
The Baring Crisis, 1890-91 
The Baring Crisis originated in Argentina but it was felt all  over the world, 
first in London.  Borrowing from Britain had dominated the capital inflows 
of the 1880s boom.  So when the bust arrived, its impact was sure to be felt 
by the major creditors.  One famous institution had become deeply exposed 
to Argentine securities: the world’s largest merchant bank, Baring Brothers & 
Co., commonly known as Barings.’  Fortunately for them, there was  a swift 
intervention by the Bank of England. The  Governor was notified by telegraph 
to hastily return to the City from his slu vacation in Scotland and, before the 
markets knew anything of the parlous state of Barings’ balance sheet, the Bank 
cajoled a rescue package from a syndicate of private banks? This chain of events 
gave the crisis its name, but the nomenclature is unfortunate to the extent that it 
encourages a focus on events in Britain rather than Argentina. For the impact 
on the British economy, once the rescue was  secured, turned out to be very 
limited indeed? Argentina did not escape so lightly. 
1. This bank no longer exists. Readers with an eye for contemporary events might wonder which 
Baring Crisiswe are tallang about. Despite survivingits eponymous crisis in the 1890s, Barings 
collapsed a century later.  In the “other” Baring crisis, in 1994-95,  the cause was internal:  a 
“rogue trader,” Nick Leeson of the Singapore office, who ran up unauthorized bets on Japanese 
equity, government bonds, and associated options worth around $30 billion. With bank capital 
at $600 million, when these bets went south Barings failed spectacularly. It  was eventually put 
into receivership and absorbed by ING, a Dutch house. 
2. A contemporary analog would be the rescue of Long Term Capital Management by  several 
New York private banks orchestrated under closed-door secrecy and with heavy moral suasion 
by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York after the Asian and Russian crises in 1997. 
3. Several scholars have examined the impact of the crisis on the British financial system.  For 
Pressnell (1968, pp. 200-04), the crisis did not spread to the entire financial system thanks to 
timely intervention by the Bank of England as a Lender of Last Resort. He  viewed the Baring 
Crisis as a typical banking crisis. In such a scenario, a single bank suddenly cannot “realize” 
a large portion of its assets.  Rumors about the virtual insolvency of the house spread in the 
inner financial circles of London. The  Bank of England, with guarantees from a syndicate of 
bankers, advanced sums to meet Barings’ immediate maturing liabilities and then liquidated 
the bank over a period of years.  Batchelor (1984) refined Pressnell’s argument, emphasizing 
that the problems were specific to Barings and not the whole money market. 
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The  Crisis and the  Trilemma 
Our earlier examination of the statistical record for 1890-91  has shown that 
the crisis had severe macroeconomic implications for the Argentine economy. 
One immediately striking aspect is  the discrepancy between changes in the 
monetary base and in the money stock, or, equivalently, in the volatility of the 
money multiplier.  In 1890, there was a 40 percent increase in the monetary 
base, but an increase of only 11 percent in the money stock. 
Such contractionary effects resulted, as we have seen before, principally from 
the public’s behavior (Table 2.4).  The rise in the currency-money ratio con- 
tributed negatively to money growth, and this effect, all else being equal, would 
have reduced the money stock by 32 percent.  More cautious behavior by the 
commercial banks was  another important factor, evidenced by  a rise in the 
reserve-deposit ratio that also contributed negatively to the change in the out- 
standing stock of money. 
In 1891  there was a sudden reduction in the rate of growth of the monetary 
base to an annual rate of 6.4 percent. But the public’s preference for monetary 
base over bank money was still growing and the money stock fell by a further 
26 percent.  The money multiplier dropped from 2.2 in 1890 to 1.6 in 1891. 
In addition, banks began to fail with implications for the broad money supply. 
Notable here was the demise in 1891  of the most important commercial bank, 
the Banco de la Provincia de Buenos Aires, which, by itself, explained 31  percent 
of the decline in the money multiplier. 
Thus, at first, the Baring Crisis exhibited the symptoms of a typical banking 
crisis in which the money stock is reduced through three channels: increases 
in  the currency-money ratio by the public; increases in the reserve-deposit 
ratio by banks; and the liquidation of some financial institutions, implying the 
destruction of deposits. 
These patterns may sound familiar, but in one crucial way the Argentine 
experience differed from the typical banking crises of the nineteenth century 
as experienced in core countries. Despite a fall in the nominal stock of money, 
there was a rise in both the price level and the income velocity of money (defined 
as the ratio of real output to real cash balances). The velocity index abruptly 
changed from an average value of 1.6 in 1884-90 to 3.1 in 1891, a rise clearly 
influenced by the demise of the banks of issue: 
That velocity was volatile and rising reveals how adjustment in the fiduciary 
system worked once capital inflows stopped. In  a typical specie standard system, 
in which specie is a major component of monetary assets, hoarding generally 
4. We should also note that this result is not dependent on a velocity definition that stresses the 
role of money as an asset (that is the use of broad money as the definition of money).  An 
index of the transactions velocity of currency redefined by using the monetary base shows the 
same pattern: from an average value of 3.8 in 1884-91,  the index rises to 4.9 in 1891 reflecting 
sudden illiquidity in an inflationary situation. Cartoon 3.1. John Bullordena que los bancos ojiciales sean reducidos a cenizas asiprevaleceran en absoluto 
el Banco de Londrer y la ordenes de la City. (John Bull orders that the official banks be reduced to 
ashes, so that the power of the Bank of London and the orders ofThe City will prevail.) 
Notes: This cartoon is a reference to the massive shock to the financial system during the Baring 
Crisis that left the domestic banking sector in ruins.  Only the foreign banks survived, many of 
them British.  Seat and bank are the same word in Spanish (banco)-a  play on words.  Finance 
Minister Vicente Fidel Ldpez (left) and President Carlos Pellegrini (right) make firewood from 
seats bearing the names of the Banco de la Provincia de Buenos Aires and the Banco Nacional. 
Already in flames are the other provincial banks. The  Englishman supervising the pyre clutches a 
bag of libras esterlinas (pounds sterling) as teary-eyed financiers look on. 
Source:  El mosyuifo, afio 28, no. 1473,  April 12,1891. 70  Straining at the Anchor 
increases in reaction to banking crises and the transactions velocity of currency 
falls?  In the Argentine case, we have seen that already, from 1887, metallic 
hoarding had been steadily increasing. This reflected the failure of the monetary 
authorities to establish a credible mixed specie and fiduciary standard in which 
paper would exchange at par with gold. 
Why was the Argentine velocity volatile and rising in this period?  There 
was, in essence, a divergent movement in what we might term  the “paper” 
velocity and the “specie”  velocity!  In this context, currency substitution even- 
tually nullified the expansionary actions of the government. We might say that 
the sterilization policies of 1888-89 had had the “benign” effect of expanding 
the economy without generating inflation in the very short run; but once the 
sources of outside money became depleted, as gold stocks were run down, nom- 
inal variables adjusted upward from their “repressed”  values. This view can be 
interpreted as showing that, in a small open economywith free capital mobility 
and a fixed exchange rate, one can only have an independent monetary policy 
in the very short run-a  facet of the famous open-economy “trilemma.”7 In 
short, the inconsistent policies of the Argentine authorities were in the process 
of being exposed. 
The Key Events of the Crisis 
We now document the unfolding ofthe  crisis in more detail. Historical statistics 
complement the narrative, but we are hindered by the paucity of data in certain 
areas. For many financial variables we have the benefit of some high-frequency 
data.  The real sector of the economy also shared the burden of adjustment, 
although the extent is hard to gauge. The rapidly changing trajectory of the 
real sector is partially obscured by the use of annual data, making it difficult to 
identify channels through which the banking crisis affected the real economy. 
The  timing and intensity of the crisis can be seen in Table 3.1,  and the data reveal 
much about the internal and external monetary and financial deterioration. 
The  first run on the financial system occurred in the first quarter of 1890 and 
was focused on the two leading banks: the Banco Nacional and the Banco de 
la Provincia de Buenos Aires. It came as a culmination of a year of continuous 
drain on the specie reserves of all the banks of issue and was  aggravated by 
5. The  transactions velocity of currency is defined as red output divided by the amount of metallic 
currency held by the nonbank public. See Bordo and Jonung (1987, pp. 22-28). 
6. The  “paper”  velocity index took the following values: in 1888 1.3, in 1889 1.4, in 1890 1.7, and 
in 1891 3.1. The  “specie”  velocity (defined as real activity index divided by metallic hoarding) 
took the following values: in 1888 20.2, in 1889 12.6, in 1890 8.1, and in 1891 6.4. 
7. The “trilemma” is the statement that of three policy objectives-a  fixed exchange rate, free 
capital mobility, and an independent monetary policy-only  two out of three are attainable at 
once. See Obstfeld and Taylor (1998) and Chapter 1  above. A Monetary and Financial Wreck  71 
Table 3.1. The Baring Crisis,  1889-91 
Vault Cash at  Deposits at  Cash-Deposit 
Banco de la  Banco de la  Ratio at  Exchange  External 
Provincia de  Provincia de  Private  Rate  Interest 
Period  Buenos Aires  Buenos Ares  Banks  Paper-Gold  Rate 
1889  IV  8.1  138.5  0.34  2.33  5.32 
1890  I  -  126.8  -  2.53  5.75 
I1  -  124.6  0.29  2.39  5.32 
111  -  113.2  -  2.42  6.02 
IV  16.2  132.0  0.32  3.09  6.49 
1891  I  5.7  103.8  -  3.49  6.58 
I1  -  77.7  0.22  3.80  7.46 
I11  -  71.0  -  4.03  8.20 
IV  1.9  67.3  0.42  3.75  8.06 
Notes andsources: Vault cash and deposits at Banco de la Provincia de Buenos Aires in millions 
of paper pesos.  Exchange rate in paper pesos per gold peso. External interest rate is yield to 
maturity of long-term external public bonds, specifically the 1886-87  Argentine Bond of 5 
percent. Data are from the same sources as the annual data used elsewhere. See Appendix 1. 
the news that Barings had failed to fully float a loan of 25 milLon gold pesos.' 
This was a signal that the supply of foreign capital was going to tighten for 
Argentina, and for the government in particular. Deposits in the Banco de la 
Provincia de Buenos Aires fell by 11.7 million pesos, an amount that could not 
be met out of the cash on hand the bank.9 
One striking aspect of the portfolio management of the two banks was that 
they maintained a persistently lower cash-deposit ratio than the private com- 
mercial banks. For example, in 1889,  the Banco de la Provincia de Buenos Aires 
maintained a cash-deposit ratio of only 5.8 percent, far below the 34 percent 
average cash-deposit ratio of private banks.  This relatively illiquid situation 
derived in part from their role as fiscal agents of the national and provincial 
governments. The  literature of the period argues that the banks often made ad- 
vances to their respective governments in exchange for short- and medium-term 
treasury bills; but these treasury bills were not traded in the stock market and, 
hence, they were not very liquid assets. Facing massive deposit withdrawals by 
the public, the last resort for liquid funds was to appeal directly to the Treasury 
rather than sell assets in the financial market. 
A complementary reason for the banks to heavily invest in more illiquid and 
risky assets was an expectation of low liquidity costs thanks to the state acting 
as a backstop. That is, the banks assumed that the monetary authorities would 
8. The loan in question was the soon-to-be-famous Buenos Ares Water Supply and Drainage 
Company Loan (Ferns 1973, p. 456). 
9. Unfortunately, quarterly figures for deposits at the Banco Nacional are not available. Nevcr- 
theless, there is no reason to believe that the state of affairs in this bank, and in other smaller 
banks of issue, was much different than at the Banco de la Provincia de Buenos Aires. 72  Straining at the Anchor 
bail them out if they became illiquid; hence they could overinvest in more risky 
assets with higher average yields. This is the classic moral hazard problem when 
explicit or implicit state guarantees are extended to banks. 
Thus, an informal system arose that locked in bad incentives: the govern- 
ments had no incentive to control the lending procedures of the banks of issue 
since the governments were major beneficiaries of the banks’ lending function 
as fiscal agents of the state. Looking ahead, only the need for postcrisis reform 
would eventually create the political will to radically change the risky portfolio 
structure of the one surviving state bank. 
As expected, when the first run occurred, the national government intervened 
on behalf of the two banks, authorizing a new issue of paper notes to meet the 
withdrawal of deposits.  This rediscount policy had, of course, an immediate 
and serious drawback that was felt as pressure in the foreign exchange market. 
Deposits were taken out of the system and this increased pressure on metallic 
assets as well as on the burden of servicing the external debt. As a result, the 
internal liquidity crisis was temporarily halted by a 20 percent depreciation of 
the paper currency and an increase in the risk premium demanded by foreign 
investors. 
Clearly, if a return to parity was the government’s goal, such note issues could 
not be contemplated as being the end of the adjustment process, and some fiscal 
action would be needed. Finance Minister Francisco Uriburu indicated that the 
rescue operation would be complemented by drastic fiscal changes and asked 
approval for an immediate 15  percent increase in trade taxes,  with the suggestion 
that half of import duties be paid in hard currency. He  still defended the role of 
the government as a Lender of Last Resort and indicated that the government’s 
guarantees ought to come at a price when he demanded the resignation of the 
government-appointed  directors of the Banco Nacional so as to implement a 
change in lending policies.10  But despite his pragmatic intentions, the minister 
lacked the support of his peers, and he was obliged to resign in early July. At 
the same time the Banco Nacional informed Barings that they would suspend 
debt service on the national foreign bonds. 
The national government was now steering a dangerous course between for- 
eign constraints and domestic objectives. On the external front, the stern re- 
sponse from a lending syndicate formed by the Bank of England, the Banque 
de France, and the Reichsbank was that an emergency loan would be granted 
only on the strictest conditions. There would be have to be no new loans for ten 
years, no more paper money issues, and a promise of strict economy from the 
10. See Williams (1920, pp.  115-16)  and Ferns (1973, pp.  451 and chap.  6). During Urihuru’s 
brief tenure of five months at the Finance Ministry, advances by the Banco de la Provincia 
de Buenos Aires were reduced from a monthly average of three million pesos to less than one 
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government.”  On the internal front, the government continued to lend openly 
to the official banks to stave off the liquidity crisis. This was done without any 
major structural reform, producing a second run on the banks. 
The constraints were such that the government had to choose between two 
options:  to liquidate the official banks and resume payments abroad with the 
help of the emergency loan, or to continue the rescue operation of the official 
banks and engage in a policy of open inflation and external default. The Ex- 
ecutive opted for the latter, but their strategy was soon opposed by Congress 
and a major political crisis erupted. Only weeks after Uriburu’s departure, the 
ruling President Miguel Juirez Celman (1886-90) resigned on August 6, to be 
succeeded in the remainder of his term by his Vice-president, Carlos Pellegrini 
It was an open question whether the new government would pursue reforms 
or business as usual. Initially, the Pellegrini administration sent mixed signals 
to the markets. Even as a drastic change in the lending policies of official banks 
was announced, the finance ministry simultaneously decided to rediscount 60 
million pesos to clean up the books of the City of Buenos Aires, the National 
Mortgage Bank, and the official banks. The action to prop up the banks saw 
some success. By the end of 1890  there was some increase in private deposits and 
the banks found they could replenish their reserves. The internal convertibility 
of deposits at the banks of issue appeared to have been ensured by the continued 
Lender-of-Last-Resort  actions of the new government.” 
Still, the external constraints had not changed. Despite official intentions to 
avoid default, the burden ofthe debt service was unsupportable. Annual interest 
on the debt amounted to 40 percent of 1890 fiscal  revenue^.'^  In the short run 
default could not be averted, and the only hope was  to achieve a dignified 
resolution via a debt rescheduling agreement with the foreign creditors.  In 
November the government sent a mission to London to arrange a moratorium 
with  Barings.  The timing of this mission was  hardly  auspicious, since the 
Bank of England had only just intervened to save the merchant house from 
Argentina’s earlier and ongoing default. Nonetheless, the Bank of England and 
the Argentine government concluded an agreement to overcome the crisis and, 
by January 1891, a new loan was advanced to Argentina to enable it to repay 
the annual installments of interest on the external bonds. 
Of course, the loan had strings attached. The creditors wanted to see serious 
economic reforms. A clause of the loan required the Argentine government “to 
(1  890-92). 
11. Williams (1920, p.  114). 
12. Another signal that the Pellegrini administration would not let down the official banks was 
the imposition of a 2 percent tax on deposits in foreign-owned banks-an  attempt to motivate 
depositors to switch toward state and national-chartered  banks (Ferns 1973, p. 460). 
13. The 1890 service of the funded debt amounted to 29  million paper  pesos and  1890 fiscal 
revenues were 73 million paper pesos. On  the debt service and fiscal revenues see Appendix 1 
and Chapter 4. 74  Straining at the Anchor 
undertake officially to cancel bank notes to the amount of at least 15 million 
pesos a year for three years, so long as and whenever the gold premium should 
be above 50 per~ent.”’~  This condition was to have immediate monetary and 
financial repercussions in the country. If the government intended to abide by 
the agreement, the ongoing flow of rediscounts to bail out the banks would 
have to stop. 
Would the banks be secure without that lifeline? An answer was soon pro- 
vided.  A third and devastating run on the banks of issue resulted when the 
public again tested the convertibility of deposits into cash.  The government 
sought to manage the run and ensure convertibility without printing money by 
attempting to float a 100 million peso issue, euphemistically termed the “Inter- 
nal Patriotic Loan”; but when they went to the bond market the subscription 
failed.  Only 28 million could be obtained in cash, and it came mainly from 
other private banks.” There was nothing to be done. The  official banks closed 
their doors at the end of April 1891 and the third banking crisis quickly ex- 
ploded into a total financial panic. During this chaos the reserves of the private 
banks were hard hit, their cash-deposit ratio falling to 22 percent, the lowest 
level in history. 
To Bail or Not to Bail? 
The demise of the two official banks in  1891 soon sparked a fierce debate 
among contemporary pundits, policymakers, and politicians. Was the decision 
to let the banks fail a major policy mistake or was it simply unavoidable? The 
debate has continued ever since among scholars interested in this episode and 
the lessons it might offer for the design of sound financial systems and the 
provision of banking insurance. Problems of moral hazard are potentially more 
serious when banks might be seen, or see themselves, as “too big to fail.” But 
despite their size and importance to the financial system, the two big state banks 
were left to founder and no bailout was forthcoming. 
We can present only a flavor of the competing views of this episode.  One 
tradition lays the blame at the door of the government.  The contemporary 
observer JosC  Terry emphatically criticized the timing of debt management 
policies.’6 In his view, the authorities failed to clearly define the legal relation- 
ship between the banks of issue and their depositors while granting preference 
14. Memorias de Hacienda (1891, pp. 207-31); Williams (1920, p.  127). 
15. Subscriptions to the 1891 Internal Patriotic Loan were 44 million pesos in par value;  the 
realized value was only 29 million; that is, the bonds were floated at 65 percent of par. Of  the 
proceeds, 11 million pesos were rediscounted to the Banco Nacional and the rest went to the 
Banco de la Provincia de Buenos Aires. Figures fromTerry (1893, pp. 192-93).  Joslin (1963, 
p.  126) argues that the Bank of London and the River Plate helped to float the loan but he 
does not present evidence on the terms or the motivation for this action. 
16. Terry (1893, pp.  168-77). A Monetary and Financial Wreck  75 
to external creditors. This institutional uncertainty, he argued, produced un- 
necessary anxiety in the financial system until the collapse of April 1891. A 
different viewpoint would find more fault with the banks themselves. Williams 
thought that fraudulent behavior and wildcat banking were the main problems 
of these institutions, and therefore their liquidation was to be tolerated, even 
wel~omed.'~  Their bankruptcy simply reflected how the financial system ad- 
justed once there was a hard commitment to a new regime and disinflation was 
seen as inevitable. 
Such a discussion naturally requires us to consider the solvency-liquidity 
position of the banks in question. Table 3.2 presents some solvency-liquidity 
indicators for the Banco de la Provincia de Buenos Aires, where we restrict 
attention to the purely commercial banlung operations.I8 The balance sheets 
shown here are net of official and governmental loans on the asset side and 
net of outstanding paper notes on the liability side. The table reports two key 
indicators, which we introduce as follows. 
A commercial bank faces a liquidity criris if the vault cash from the last period 
VCf-l is insufficient to cover the desired withdrawal of deposits -ADf in the 
current period; that is, if 
VCt-1 + AD, =z Xf < 0, 
where we call Xf  the liquidity level. The  bank faces a solvencyproblem if the net 
value of assets At,  which equals total assets less nonperforming assets, is less 
than the value of deposits Df;  that is, if 
At -  D, = Y, < 0.  (3.2) 
where we call Yf  the sohency hue/. 
The figures in Table 3.2 seem to support Williams' view that bank solvency 
eroded during the Juirez Celman administration. However, the solvency indi- 
cator is an ex post realization whose causal factors need to be considered in more 
depth.  The solvency level depends on two processes: depositor behavior and 
the change in the net value of commercial assets (see the penultimate expression 
above). The latter is, in turn, endogenously determined by two factors. First, 
exogenous changes in general economic conditions that could affect the per- 
formance of risky assets; and, second, internal management decisions to prune 
illiquid assets from the portfolio. This latter decision may generate losses and 
insolvencies sufficient to cause the failure of the bank. 
Both failed banks had heavily invested in mortgage and real estate operations 
during the boom ofthe eighties. These assets were particularly sensitive to both 
(3.1) 
17. Williams (1920, p.  120). 
18. Lack of complete data for the Banco Nacional precludes a similar empirical treatment of that 
bank's position. However, a cursory glance at its accounts suggests that the financial situation 
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Table 3.2. Solvency-Liquidity Indicators, Banco de  la Provincia, 1886-91 
Year  Deposits  Level  Value of Assets  Level  Rural Land 
1886  10.4  9.2  0.7  5.9  100 
1887  -1.8  10.2  -0.1  7.6  196 
1888  17.8  18.9  27.1  16.9  375 
1889  28.4  33.2  23.8  12.3  211 
1890  -6.5  1.6  -10.8  8.0  150 
1891  -53.3  -37.1  -72.7  -11.4  95 
Change in  Liquidity  Change in Net  Solvency  Relative Price of 
Notes and sources:  Change in deposits, liquidity level, change in net value of assets, and solvency 
level computed from official balance sheets of the Banco de la Provincia de Buenos Aires and 
are expressed in millions of paper pesos.  Assets are the sum of loans and advances, vault cash, 
and physical capital minus provincial governmental balances.  The net value of assets is assets 
minus nonperforming assets. The relative price of rural land is the average price per hectare in 
the province of Buenos Aires deflated by the price level.  Land prices were estimated by CortOs 
Conde (1979, p.  164). Price level from Appendiv 1. 
the business cycle and government finances. At the first sign of recession, the 
price of land (relative to wholesale prices) declined abruptly and this had a 
negative impact on the asset quality of the bank portfolio.” A delayed change 
in lending practices might have caused even more insolvency problems, a self- 
defeating policy.  So the banks signaled that funds would be rationed. 
Borrowers, already distressed by market conditions, perceived that the costs 
of defaulting were less than the costs of repayment. In consequence, solvency 
levels collapsed.  When such an  interruption  of loan service took place the 
ratio of nonperforming assets to performing assets rose from an average level 
of 6 percent for the boom years, to 21 percent by the end of 1891 (see row 
19 in Table 2.3). And there was worse to follow: in addition to the currency 
substitution motives already noted, the public’s withdrawal of deposits now 
responded to this portfolio deterioration.  The run on deposits increased the 
liquidity needs of the banks and further inhibited the renewal of genuine loans, 
generating a vicious spiral. 
Postscript: The  Baring Crisis in Historical Perspective 
What can be learned by a contemporary observer looking back at the Baring 
Crisis, the first-ever full-fledged emerging market crisis of the modern era? If 
there are useful lessons to be learned from it then, a century on, the persistence of 
such crises raises serious questions: Have the events of the past been forgotten? 
19. The  typical collateral assets used for security against loan losses were mortgage bonds (ce‘du/as 
hipotecarias) floated by the Provincial Mortgage Bank and “other  assets” (otros titulos), the latter 
probably consisting of company assets and the pledge of land as lien. In 1890, the value of such 
collateral represented 37 percent of the performing assets, shrinking to 24 percent by  1891. 
This reflected capital losses due to the collapse of the mortgage bond market in 1890. Figures 
are from Cuccorese (1972, pp. 351-52). A Monetary and Financial Wreck  77 
Are there attributes of contemporary crises that are more difficult to manage? 
Or are we still trying to cope with the same institutional dilemmas that faced 
Argentine policymakers in the late nineteenth century? 
The Baring Crisis carried all the hallmarks of an emerging market crisis. It 
began with an intended fixed exchange-rate commitment.  Although the peg 
soon failed, there was  a strong signal from the government  of an intention 
to repeg at the same parity, even as the exchange rate floated away.  Such an 
announcement corresponds to the “restoration rule” proposed by McKinnon as 
an antidote to currency crashes like the Asian Crisis of 1997.2’  Did it work 
in the Argentine case? The answer is no, and the reasons come down to the 
government seeking for too long to hide from the fundamental trilemma and 
the fiscal-monetary nexus of the intertemporal budget constraint. 
Just as today, global capital markets were very well integrated in the 1880s, 
and Argentina was fully open to them. At  the macro level, as we have seen, this 
took the form of massive capital inflows, mainly from Britain. At  the micro level, 
a major conduit was the decision of the major banks to make a play to borrow 
short-term overseas in gold (hard currency) and lend long-term domestically (in 
paper pesos), particularly during the final spasm of the 1880s boom. This play 
was encouraged by the poor design the Law of National Guaranteed Banks and, 
given the ongoing absence of banking regulations and reserve requirements, it 
could be leveraged a long way.  Although it was  a very leveraged play it was 
a great gamble so long as the guarantee  was  good.  So long as  par was  to 
be resumed, and so long as the government’s best efforts managed to keep the 
exchange rate within reasonable bounds during the presumed-to-be-temporary 
dirty float, the banks stood to make high profits. The conventional wisdom on 
contemporary crises now begins to look like “dkja vt~  all over again.”  In the 
1880s in Argentina we had all the same volatile ingredients present:  currency 
mismatches, maturity mismatches, lack of sound regulation and transparency 
in the operations of the banking system, and, above it all, an unsustainable 
commitment by the authorities to an exchange rate peg?’ 
Why was the exchange rate unsustainable?  In one sense, it was the same 
old problem.  The fiscal superstructure of the Argentine state was still weak, 
a continuing legacy inherited from the decades of monetary anarchy and an 
excessive reliance on seigniorage in times of crisis when other tax sources failed. 
An added complication, however, came from new commitments to economic 
modernization that were bolted on to this superstructure in the 1880s, through 
both legislation and day-to-day practice. Two commitments stand out in the 
money and banking area: the government’s desire to adopt a metallic regime and 
commit to a peg; and its evolving tendency-organic  more than systematic- 
to take on board a Lender-of-Last-Resort  role via the state banks.  Here the 
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Cartoon 3.2. Con sus amores arteros la dejaron cual la ves, y boy  gue la Patria esta en cueros  guiere 
cubrirla el ingle's.  (With her cunning lovers that left her as you see her, today Argentina is naked 
and the Englishman wants to cover her.)' 
Notes: The  cartoon conveys the idea that with the wealth ofthe country having been misused by the 
local politicians in the 1880s-and  also because of this--only the English financiers stand ready 
to save the country in its time of crisis. The  republic is left naked, sitting on a pile of debts, and 
the rascals escape having stolen her clothes.  The various thieves are the politicians in the guise 
of their popular caricatures: the monster-gaucho  is Marcos Juarez; the sailor, Leandro N. Alem; 
the fox, Julio A. Roca; the sheep, Mansilla; the monkey, Ramon Carcano; the donkey, President 
Miguel Juarez Celman. Alem was one of the principal members of opposition politics, the leader 
of the famous uprising known as the Revolucidn delparque, which is why he has a heart bearing the 
inscription el delparyue. He wears the typical white beret of the Union Civica party, which soon 
become the Uni6n Civica Radical after Mitre left to make a pact with Roca. 
Source: Don Quijote,  afio 7, no. 37, May 17,1891. 
trilemma bites with great force. Absent other fiscal devices, Lender-of-Last- 
Resort actions will press the government to untie its hands and deviate from a 
purely endogenous money supply process. 
Thus,  with its combination of monetary-fiscal inconsistencies and imprudent 
financial regulation, there was hardly a dangerous ingredient that the Baring 
Crisis did not have. It  was only a matter of time. At the eleventh hour, Finance 
Minister Uriburu had seen the need for drastic action to close the fiscal gap, 
for real taxes to supplant money printing, but few others were persuaded. Yet, 
within only a few weeks the situation had detriorated so much that President 
Pellegrini found persuading the doubters suddenly very easy, with the banks on A Monetary and Financial Wreck  79 
the brink of a devastating run, foreign creditors holding a gun, and the hopes 
for a return to parity having disappeared as quickly as the gold reserve. 
What still might seem remarkable is the courage and conviction with which 
the government rose from this absolute nadir. They achieved this by a series of 
tough choices informed by a clear realization of fundamental economic princi- 
ples such as the trilemma, the government budget constraint, and moral hazard. 
A new commitment to parity was made credible by the adoption of a currency 
board. Serious fiscal reforms were adopted so as to take seigniorage out of the 
policy mix.  Banks were allowed to fail.  But restoration  at the old par was, 
despite some efforts, eventually given up as unattainable. The costs were seen 
as too high, as we shall see. The float had gone so far out of control and had 
passed through so fully into prices that a harsh deflation all the way back to par 
would have created a deep recession via debt-deflation and expectation effects. 
For all the reforms, however, the new Argentine economic regime was still 
left ill-prepared for the future in some respects. Although the macroeconomic 
reforms were clearly signposted and adopted with firm resolve, the microeco- 
nomic foundation remained fragile. There  was no new clear and comprehensive 
set of banking regulations. Admittedly, in the short run, the harm that could 
be done was very limited:  many banks had failed, and the ones that survived 
were chastened by the experience. Overborrowing and high leverage were not 
on their agenda for a while, not that access to international markets was soon 
forthcoming to permit it. But eventually, in the distant future, this lack of at- 
tention to correct even just one of the institutional failures of the 1880s was to 
come back and cause further havoc. 
Last, it is ironic that, while Argentina struggled after the crisis to overcome 
a reputation for irresponsible internal economic shocks, in the decades ahead 
the shocks that were to rattle the Argentines were not of their own making but 
rather emanated from the core of the world economy. In economic and other 
affairs, the generation of Sarmiento and Pellegrini had hoped to emulate the 
“civilized” countries, and in economic policies this had meant converging on 
the gold standard consensus of the time, playing by the “rules of the game,” and 
embracing open markets. After 1900,  this dream started to become reality. The 
triumph of the Belle Epoque was that Argentina succeeded better than anyone 
might have expected in this imitation, becoming along the way the darling of 
foreign investors and one of the fastest growing economies in the world. The 
tragedy-for  Europe, the World, and for Argentina-was  that the assumptions 
that lay behind this strategy were about to be destroyed by wars, protectionism, 
distrust, and a global depression. Looking ahead, our discussion resonates with 
contemporary policy analysis of optimal developing country reforms, and here 
Argentine history clearly illustrates how global shocks can have particularly 
unfortunate consequences for peripheral countries with open markets for goods 
and capital, but immature monetary, fiscal, and financial systems. 